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Abstract: We introduce the so far most efficient attack against the Kirchhoff-law–
Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system. This attack utilizes the lack of exact 
thermal equilibrium in practical applications and is based on cable resistance losses and the 
fact that the Second Law of Thermodynamics cannot provide full security when such 
losses are present. The new attack does not challenge the unconditional security of the 
KLJN scheme, but it puts more stringent demands on the security/privacy enhancing 
protocol than for any earlier attack. In this paper we present a simple defense protocol to 
fully eliminate this new attack by increasing the noise-temperature at the side of the 
smaller resistance value over the noise-temperature at the at the side with the greater 
resistance. It is shown that this simple protocol totally removes Eve’s information not only 
for the new attack but also for the old Bergou-Scheuer-Yariv attack. The presently most 
efficient attacks against the KLJN scheme are thereby completely nullified. 
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1. Introduction 
The Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) scheme [1,2], shown in Figure 1, is a classical statistical 
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physical competitor to a quantum key distribution for secure communication. For the duration of a 
single bit exchange, the communicating parties (Alice and Bob) connect their randomly chosen resistor 
and corresponding noise-voltage generator to a wire line (cable). These resistors are randomly selected 
from the publicly known set RL ,RH{ } , RL ≠ RH , where the elements represent low (L) and high (H) bit 
values. The Gaussian voltage noise generators—mimicking the Fluctuation-Dissipation Theorem and 
delivering band-limited white noise with publicly agreed bandwidth—produce enhanced thermal 
(Johnson) noise at a publicly agreed effective temperature Teff , typically being Teff ≥109K  [3], so the 
temperature of the wire can be neglected. The noises are statistically independent of each other and 
from the noise of the former bit period.  
In the case of secure bit exchange—i.e., the LH or HL bit situations for Alice and Bob—an 
eavesdropper (Eve) cannot distinguish between these two situations by measuring the mean-square 
value of the voltage  Uc(t)  and/or current  Ic(t)  in the cable, because both arrangements lead to the 
same result. In the rest of the paper we assume that one of these secure bit exchange situations (either 
LH or HL) apply. 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic of the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise secure key exchange system. To defend 
against active and hacking attacks, the cable parameters and integrity are randomly monitored; the 
instantaneous voltage Uc(t) and current Ic(t) amplitudes in the cable are measured and compared via 
public authenticated data exchange; and full spectral and statistical analysis/checking is carried out by 
Alice and Bob. R, t and Teff denote resistance, time and effective temperature, respectively. Line filters, 
etc., are not shown. 
 
To avoid potential information leak by variations in the shape of a probability distribution, the 
noises are Gaussian [1], and it has been proven that other distributions are not secure [4,5]. From a 
physics perspective, the security is provided by the Second Law of Thermodynamics because 
directional information, due to the direction of power flow, does not exist since the mean power flow is 
zero even though the LH and HL situations have asymmetric resistance arrangements [1]. In other 
words, the security of the ideal KLJN scheme against passive (non-invasive listening/measuring) 
attacks is as strong as the impossibility to build a perpetual motion machine of the second kind. The 
security against active (invasive) attacks is—perhaps surprisingly—provided by the robustness of 
classical physical quantities, which guarantees that these quantities can be monitored (and their 
integrity with the cable parameters and model can be checked) continuously without destroying their 
values. We observe, in passing, that the situation is totally different for the case of quantum physics. 
 3 
 
 
The most famous and explored, and so far the most effective, attack against the non-ideal KLJN 
scheme is the Bergou-Scheuer-Yariv (BSY) cable resistance attack [6,7] which utilizes the fact that, 
due to the non-zero cable resistance, the mean-square voltage will be slightly less at the cable end with 
the smaller resistance value than at the other end with the greater resistance. It should be noted that the 
results (including their physical units) are wrong in Ref. [7], but a correct evaluation of the BSY effect 
was carried out later by Kish and Scheuer (KS) [8]. Eve’s measured absolute difference between the 
mean-square voltages 
 
UcH
2 (t)  and 
 
UcL
2 (t)  of the “H” and “L” ends (cf. Figure 2) is given by [8] 
 
ΔKS = UcH2 (t) − UcL2 (t) = 4kTeffΔf
Rc
2 RH − RL( )
RH + Rc + RL( )2
 ,       (1) 
where k is Boltzmann’s constant,  Δf  is noise bandwidth and Rc is cable resistance. Clearly  ΔKS  scales 
with the square of the cable resistance, i.e.,  ΔKS ∝ Rc2 . 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Scheme devised to illustrate the Bergou-Scheuer-Yariv attack and the Second-Law-attack. 
Alice’s and Bob’s locations are arbitrary in the figure. During the Second-Law-attack, the powers 
flowing out from the “H” and “L” ends of the cable are calculated and compared. The temperature of 
the cable resistor Rc can be neglected because of the high noise temperature of the generators. The 
notation is consistent with that in Figure 1. 
 
 
2. Results and Discussion 
2.1. The Second-Law-attack  
In the rest of the paper we use the rules about transformations of noise spectra in linear systems, 
along with Johnson’s formula for thermal noise, and write [1]  
 
UR
2 (t) = 4kTeff RΔf    .          (2) 
Here
 
UR
2 (t)  denotes mean-square voltage fluctuations on the resistor, with resistance R, within the 
bandwidth Δf . 
       The cable resistance has a non-zero value, and therefore the resistors and their noise generators are 
not in thermal equilibrium in practical versions of the KLJN system (with  Teff  much greater than the 
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cable temperature). Consequently the Second Law of Thermodynamics cannot provide full security. 
The cable-heating powers by the generators at the “H” and “L” ends are different and are given by 
 
PHc = IA
2 (t) Rc =
4kTeff RHΔf
RH + Rc + RL( )2
Rc   ,       (3) 
and 
 
PLc = IB
2 (t) Rw =
4kTeff RLΔf
RH + Rc + RL( )2
Rc = PHc
RL
RH
 .      (4) 
The difference between  PHc  and  PLc  can be utilized for the Second-Law-attack, because the resistor 
values  RH  and  RL  are publicly known. The implementation of this attack is to measure and compare 
the net power flows at the two ends of the cable, as illustrated in Figure 2. The mean power flow  PHL  
from the “H” end toward the “L” end of the cable, and the mean power flow  PLH  from the “L” end 
toward the “H” end are, respectively, 
 
PHL = UH
2 (t)
Rc + RL
RH + Rc + RL
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
1
Rc + RL
                           − UL2(t)
RH
RH + Rc + RL
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
1
RH
= 4kTeffΔf
RH Rc + RL( )− RL RH
RH + Rc + RL( )2
= 4kTeffΔf
RH Rc
RH + Rc + RL( )2       
(5) 
and 
 
PLH = UL
2(t)
Rc + RH
RH + Rc + RL
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
1
Rc + RH
                             − UH2 (t)
RL
RH + Rc + RL
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
1
RL
= 4kTeffΔf
RL Rc + RH( )− RH RL
RH + Rc + RL( )2
= 4kTeffΔf
RL Rc
RH + Rc + RL( )2    .     
(6) 
The power flows PHL  and  PLH  are directly measurable by Eve, and their difference, 
 
ΔPHL = PHL − PLH = 4kTeffΔf
Rc RH + RL( )
RH + Rc + RL( )2
 ,       (7) 
gives the difference between the powers supplied by the two cable ends; with the measured cable 
voltages and current (see Figure 2) it is 
 
ΔPHL = PHL − PLH = Ic (t)UcH (t) − − Ic (t)UcL (t)
                                          = UcH (t)+UcL (t)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ Ic (t)
  .          (8) 
It should be observed that the opposite current sign at the “L” end expresses the fact that the current 
flowing out from the “H” end is flowing into the “L” end (using the same current sign would instead 
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provide the power dissipated in the cable resistance, which is always positive and gives no directional 
information). 
Suppose now that Eve measures the above current–voltage cross-correlations at the two ends and 
evaluates the pertinent quantities. With the notation introduced in Figure 3, one finds that 
 
ΔPAB = PAB − PBA = UcA (t)+UcB(t)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ Ic (t)     .                     (9) 
As an example, suppose that  RH  has the greater resistance value and  RL  the smaller one, i.e.,  RL < RH
. In the ideal case, when Rc = 0 , one obtains  ΔPAB = 0  in accordance with the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics, which yields  Uc (t)Ic (t) = 0 . However, in the practical case, with  Rc > 0 , one 
finds 
(i) if  ΔPAB > 0 , then Alice has  RH  and Bob has  RL  , 
(ii) if  ΔPAB < 0 , then Alice has  RL  and Bob has  RH  .  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Eve’s measurements during the Second-Law-attack. The powers flowing out from the two 
ends of the cable are measured and compared. The notation is consistent with that in Figure 1. 
  
The signal inherent in the Second-Law-attack scales linearly with  Rc , which provides a much better 
situation for Eve—especially in the case of vanishing cable resistance—than the square-law scaling of 
the BSY attack. Moreover, it is also obvious that in a practical case [3,9,10], where  Rc << RL << RH , 
Eve’s signal-to-noise ratio is always greater in the Second-Law-attack than in the BSY attack. This is 
so because the BSY attack evaluates the dc fraction of  ≈ Rc
2 / RL RH( )  in the measured (empirical) 
mean-square channel noise voltage, while the Second-Law-attack evaluates the dc fraction of  Rc / RH  
in the measured mean power flow. It should be noted that the measured mean-square channel noise 
voltage, and the measured mean power flow, follow similar statistics because they are the time average 
of the products of Gaussian processes [11]. 
The Second-Law-attack is an elegant and efficient one, but it does not challenge the unconditional 
security of the KLJN scheme [2]. Eve’s probability p of successful guessing can arbitrarily approach 
the limit  p = 0.5  by proper tuning of the parameters inherent in the KLJN scheme, such as resistances 
and bandwidth, and privacy amplification can be implemented if needed; this was evaluated in detail 
elsewhere [2], where relationships were reported between security level, cable parameters and 
communication speed. Nevertheless the new Second-Law-attack is important and may significantly 
increase the demands on parameter tuning and/or necessitate elaborate privacy amplification [12], 
which of course come at a cost.  
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In the rest of this paper we demonstrate two methods capable of fully eliminating the Second-Law 
attack. The advanced method nullifies the BSY attack as well. 
2.2. Natural/“Simple” defense  
Suppose it is possible to keep the cable and the resistors at the same temperature. This temperature-
equilibration method virtually eliminates any Second-Law-attack information for Eve (but not the 
information in the BSY-attack, albeit its formula for the information leak is changed).  
Temperature equilibration constitutes a very simple defense, but the cable temperature and its 
possible variations cannot be neglected any longer. If the cable temperature is different from that of the 
resistors, then the KLJN scheme is vulnerable to the Hao-type attack [13] (see its criticism in [14]). In 
principle, with cables of homogeneous temperatures, this attack can be avoided if Alice and Bob are 
able to monitor the temperature value of the cable by resistance and Johnson noise measurements, 
since they can then choose Teff to be the same as the cable temperature. While these steps can be taken, 
the KLJN scheme is no longer simple. Moreover, the mentioned defense method may be unpractical 
because of the requirement of a homogeneous cable temperature, small noise levels, and since it 
prohibits the adoption of enhanced KLJN methods wherein Alice and Bob eliminate their own 
contributions in order to accomplish higher speed, security [9,15] and fidelity [16].  
 
2.3. Advanced defense, also eliminating all cable resistance attacks 
 
As we have seen, the cable end with the smaller resistance value emits less power toward the other 
end, and this is the foundation of the Second-Law-attack. This effect, as well as Eve’s related signal, 
can be completely eliminated by properly changing the ratio of the noise-temperatures of the 
generators for the resistors with the smaller and the greater resistance values (see Figure 4).  
Suppose now that we introduce an offset in the noise-temperatures of the generators for the  RH  and 
the  RL  resistors so that the equation 
 ΔPHL = PHL Teff( )− PLH βTeff( ) = 0                     (10) 
holds, where  Teff  is the noise temperature at the  RH  resistors and  βTeff  is the noise temperature of the 
 RL  resistors. The solution of equation (10) is 
 
β =
1+
Rc
RL
1+
Rc
RH
  .                 (11) 
This value of β  for the temperature-offset consequently eliminates Eve’s opportunity to use the 
Second-Law-attack. One finds β > 1 for  RL < RH and  β <1 for  RH < RL . 
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Figure 4. Schematic for illustrating the elimination of the Second-Law-attack and the BSY-attack by 
introduction of a proper temperature offset. The notation is consistent with that in Figure 1. 
 
The remaining, essential question is whether the defense method delineated above introduces a 
higher signal for Eve’s BSY-attack or not. Reevaluating our analysis [8] of the BSY attack with the a 
temperature offset given by Eq. 11, one obtains 
 
ΔKS Teff ,βTeff( ) = UcH2 (t) − UcL2 (t)
             = 4kTeffΔfRH
Rc
2 1−αβ( )−αRH Rc β −1( )
RH + Rc + RL( )2
   ,         (12) 
where 
 
α = RL
RH
. By substituting the above value for β , the nominator becomes zero so that 
 
ΔKS Teff ,βTeff( ) = UcH2 (t,Teff ) − UcL2 (t,βTeff ) = 0               (13) 
Hence a modification of the noise temperature of the generators supplying the noise of the RL  
resistors by the factor β  yields a complete elimination the strongest attacks against the KLJN key 
exchange scheme, namely the Second-Law-attack and the BSY-attack [6–8]. 
 
3. Conclusions  
We introduced the so far most efficient attack against the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) 
secure key exchanger, i.e., the Second-Law-attack. This attack utilizes the lack of exact thermal 
equilibrium in practical applications involving cables with non-zero resistance and results in more 
advantageous scaling and signal-to-noise ratio for Eve. 
 
Late-note: It has come to our attention that Gunn-Allison-Abbott [17] has published a paper about a 
new type of attack against the KLJN system, where the attack produces signal for Eve only at non-zero 
wire resistance. Based on our manuscript on arxiv, they tested the defense method described above in 
section 2.3 and found it working even in their system. We agree with this statement of their paper. 
Note, we extensively analyzed and criticized all their other claims of their preprint in two separate 
papers or ours [18,19]. Furthermore, they note that the "measurement" of α  may be not obvious [17] 
from a security point of view. This is a misunderstanding by them [17] because the value of α  is a 
public knowledge in the KLJN protocol [1-3]. 
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